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Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal
Justice*

RandyE. Barnett
Harvard Law School

This paperwill analyze the breakdownof our system of criminal justice in
terms of what Thomas Kuhn would describe as a crisis of an old paradigm-punishment. I propose that this crisis could be solved by the adoption of a new paradigmof criminaljustice-restitution. The approachwill
be mainly theoretical,though at various points in the discussion the practical implicationsof the rival paradigmswill also be considered.A fundamental contentionwill be that many, if not most, of our system'sills stem from
errorsin the underlyingparadigm.Any attempt to correctthese symptomatic debilities without a reexaminationof the theoretical underpinnings is
doomed to frustrationand failure. Kuhn's theories deal with the problems
of science. What made his proposalso startlingwas its attempt to analogize
scientific development to social and political development. Here, I will
simply reverse the process by applying Kuhn's framework of scientific
change to social, or in this case, legal development.'
*This paper was made possible by a research fellowship from the Law and Liberty Project of
the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, California. A somewhat expanded version of it will
appear in the book, Assessingthe Criminal.Restitution,Retributionand the Legal Process,ed. Randy E.
Barnett and John Hagel (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., in press). Also, I wish to
extend my appreciation to John V. Cody, Davis E. Keeler, Murray N. Rothbard, and Lloyd L.
Weinreb for their invaluable criticism and comments. I am greatly in their debt and hope to be able
at some future time to make suitable restitution.
1. What immediately follows is a brief outline of Kuhn's theory. Those interested in the
defenseof that theory should refer to his book, The Structureof ScientificRevolutions,2d ed., enl.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). A paradigmis an achievement in a particulardiscipline
which defines the legitimate problems and methods of researchwithin that discipline. This achievement is sufficiently unprecedentedto attractnew adherents away from rival approacheswhile providing many unsolved questions for these new practitioners to solve. As the paradigm develops and
matures, it reveals occasional inabilities to solve new problems and explain new data. As attempts are
made to make the facts fit the paradigm, the theoretical apparatusgradually becomes bulky and
awkward, like Ptolemaic astronomy. Dissatisfaction with the paradigm begins to grow. Why not
simply discard the paradigm and find another which better fits the facts? Unfortunately, this is an
arduousprocess. All the great authorities and teachers were raised with the current paradigm and see
the world through it. All the texts and institutions are committed to it. Radical alternatives hold
promise but are so untested as to make wary all but the bold. The establishment is loath to abandon
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In the criminaljustice system we are witnessing the death throes of an
old and cumbersomeparadigm,one that has dominated Western thought
for more than 900 years. While this paper presents what is hoped to be a
viable, though radicalalternative,much would be accomplishedby simply
prompting the readerto reexaminethe assumptionsunderlying the present
system. Only if we are willing to look at our old problems in a new light
do we stand a chance of solving them. This is our only hope, and our
greatest challenge.

THE CRISIS IN THE PARADIGM OF PUNISHMENT

"Political revolutions are inauguratedby a growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions
have ceasedadequatelyto meet the problems posed by an environmentthey
have in part created.

.

.

. In both political and scientific development the

sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisiteto revolution."2
Kuhn's descriptionof the preconditionsfor scientific and political revolutions could accuratelydescribethe currentstate of the criminallaw. However, simply to recognize the existence of a crisis is not enough. We must
look for its causes. The Kuhnian methodology suggests that we critically
examine the paradigmof punishment itself.
The problemswhich the paradigmof punishment is supposed to solve
are many and varied. A whole literatureon the philosophy of punishment
has arisenin an effort to justify or reject the institution of punishment. For
our purposes the following definition from the Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
should suffice: "Characteristicallypunishment is unpleasant.It is inflicted
on an offender because of an offense he has committed; it is deliberately
imposed, not just the natural consequence of a person's action (like a
hangover), and the unpleasantnessis essentialto it, not an accompanimentto
some other treatment (like the pain of the dentist's drill)."'
Two types of arguments are commonly made in defense of punishment. The first is that punishment is an appropriatemeans to some justifiable end such as, for example, deterrenceof crime. The second type of
argumentis that punishment is justified as an end in itself. On this view,
whateverill effects it might engender,punishment for its own sake is good.
The first type of argumentmight be called the politicaljustificationof
its broad and intricate theory in favor of a new and largely unknown hypothesis. Gradually, however,
as the authorities die off and the problems with the old paradigm increase, the "young turks" get a
better hearing in both the journals and the classroom. In a remarkably rapid fashion, the old
paradigm is discardedfor the new. Anyone who still clings to it is now considered to be antiquated
or eccentric and is simply read out of the profession. All research centers on the application of the
new paradigm. Kuhn characterizesthis overthrow of one paradigm by another as a revolution.
2. Ibid., p. 92.
3. Stanley I. Benn, "Punishment," in The Encyclopedia
of Philosophy,ed. Paul Edwards (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 7.:29 (emphasis added).
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punishment, for the end which justifies its use is one which a political
orderis presumablydedicatedto serve: the maintenanceof peaceful interactions between individuals and groups in a society. There are at least three
ways that deliberateinfliction of harm on an offender is said to be politically justified.
* 1. One motive for punishment, especially capital punishment and imprisonment, is the "intention to deprive offenders of the power of doing
future mischief."4 Although it is true that an offender cannot continue to
harm society while incarcerated,a strategyof punishment based on disablement has several drawbacks.
Imprisonmentis enormouslyexpensive. This means that a double burden is placed on the innocent who must suffer the crime and, in addition,
pay through taxation for the supportof the offender and his family if they
are forced onto welfare. Also, any benefit of imprisonment is temporary;
eventually, most offenders will be released. If their outlook has not improved-and especially if it has worsened-the benefits of incarcerationare
obviously limited. Finally, when disablement is permanent,as with capital
punishment or psychosurgery,it is this very permanence,in light of the
possibility of error,which is frightening. For these reasons,"where disablement enters as an element into penal theories, it occupies, as a rule, a
subordinateplace and is looked upon as an object subsidiaryto some other
end which is regardedas paramount....
2. Rehabilitiationof a criminalmeans a change in his mental habits so
that he will not offend again. It is unclearwhether the so-called treatment
model which views criminals as a doctor would view a patient is truly a
"retributive"concept. Certainlyit does not conform to the above definition
characterizingpunishment as deliberatelyand essentiallyunpleasant.It is an
open question whether any end justifies the intentional, forceful manipulation of an individual'sthought processesby anyone, much less the state. To
say that an otherwise just system has incidentally rehabilitative effects
which may be desirable is one thing, but it is quite another to argue that
these effects themselves justify the system. The horrors to which such
reasoning can lead are obvious from abundant examples in history and
contemporarysociety.6
Rehabilitationas a reaction against the punishment paradigmwill be
consideredbelow, but one aspect is particularlyrelevant to punishment as
defined here. On this view, the visiting of unpleasantnessitself will cause
the offender to see the errorof his ways; by having "justice"done him, the
criminal will come to appreciatehis error and will change his moral outlook. This end, best labeled "reformation,"is speculativeat best and counterfactualat worst. On the contrary,"it has been observed that, as a rule
4.
1913), p.
5.
6.

Heinrich Oppenheimer, The Rationaleof Punishment(London: University of London Press,
255.
Ibid.
See Thomas Szasz, Law, Liberty,and Psychiaty-(New York: Macmillan Co., .1963).
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. . . ruthless punishments, far from mollifying men's ways, corrupt them

and stir them to violence."7
3. The final justification to be treated here-deterrence-actually has
two aspects. The first is the deterrenteffect that past demonstrationsof
punishment have on the future conduct of others; the second is the effect
that threats of future punishment have on the conduct of others. The
distinction assumes importance when some advocates argue that future
threats lose their deterrenteffect when there is a lack of past demonstrations. Past punishment, then, serves as an educationaltool. It is a substitute
for or reinforcementof threats of future punishment.
As with the goals mentioned above, the empiricalquestion of whether
punishment has this effect is a disputedone.8 I shall not attempt to resolve
this question here, but will assume arguendothat punishment even as presently administeredhas some deterrenteffect. It is the moral question which
is disturbing.Can an argumentfrom deterrencealone "justify"in any sense
the infliction of pain on a criminal?It is particularlydisquieting that the
actual levying of punishment is done not for the criminal himself, but for
the educationalimpact it will have on the community. The criminal act
becomes the occasion of, but not the reason for, the punishment. In this
way, the actual crime becomes little more than an excuse for punishing.
Surelythis distorts the properfunctioning of the judicialprocess.For if
deterrence is the end it is unimportant whether the individual actually
committed the crime. Since the public's perception of guilt is the prerequisite of the deterrent effect, all that is required for deterrenceis that the
individualis "proved"to have committed the crime. The actual occurrence
would have no relevanceexcept insofar as a truly guilty person is easier to
prove guilty. The judicial process becomes, not a truth-seekingdevice, but
solely a means to legitimate the use of force. To treat criminalsas means to
the ends of others in this way raises serious moral problems. This is not to
argue that men may never use others as means but rather to question the
use of force against the individualbecause of the effect such use will have
on others. It was this that concerneddel Vecchio when he stated that "the
human person always bears in himself something sacred,and it is therefore
not permissableto treat him merely as a means towards an end ouside of
himself."9
Finally, deterrenceas the ultimate justification of punishment cannot
rationallylimit its use. It "providesno guidance until we're told how much
commission of it is to be deterred."'"Since there are always some who
commit crimes,one can always argue for more punishment. Robert Nozick
points out that there must be criteria by which one decides how much
7. Giorgio del Vecchio, "The Struggle against Crime," in The Philosophyof Punishment,ed. H.
B. Acton (London: Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 199.
8. See, e.g., Samuel Yochelson and Stanton E. Samenow, The CriminalPersonality,vol. 1, A
Profilefor Change(New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1976), pp. 411-16.
9. Del Vecchio, p. 199.
10. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State,and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 61.
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deterrencemay be inflicted." One is forced therefore to employ "higher"
principles to evaluate the legitimacy of punishment.
It is not my thesis that deterrence,reformation, and disablement are
undesirablegoals. On the contrary,any criminal justice system should be
criticallyexamined to see if it is having these and other beneficial effects.
The view advancedhere is simply that these utilitarian benefits must be
incidental to a just system; they cannot, alone or in combination, justify a
criminal justice system. Something more is needed. There is another more
antiquatedstrain of punishment theory which seeks to address this problem. The moraljustifications of punishment view punishment as an end in
itself. This approachhas taken many forms.'2On this view, whatever ill or
beneficial results it might have, punishment of lawbreakersis good for its
own sake. This proposition can be analyzedon several levels.
-The most basic question is the truth of the claim itself. Some have
argued that "the alleged absolute justice of repaying evil with evil (maintained by Kant and many other writers) is really an empty sophism. If we
go back to the Christian moralists,we find that an evil is to be put right
only by doing good."'3 This question is beyond the scope of this treatment.
The subject has been extensively dealt with by those more knowledgeable
than

"14The

more relevant question is what such a view of punishment as

a good can be said to imply for a system of criminaljustice. Even assuming
that it would be good if, in the nature of things, the wicked got their
"come-uppance,"what behaviordoes this moral fact justify? Does it justify
the victim authoring the punishment of his offender? Does it justify the
same action by the victim's family, his friends, his neighbors, the state? If
so what punishment should be imposed and who should decide?
It might be argued that the natural punishment for the violation of
natural rights is the deserved hatred and scorn of the community, the
resultant ostracism, and the existential hell of beingan evil person. The
question then is not whether we have the right to inflict some "harm"or
unpleasantnesson a morally contemptibleperson-surely, we do; the question is not whether such a punishmentis "good"-arguably, it is. The issue
is whether the "virtue of some punishment"justifies the forcefulimposition
of unpleasantnesson a rights violatoras distinguished from the morally
imperfect. Any moral theory of punishment must recognize and deal with
this distinction. Finally, it must be established that the state is the legitimate authorof punishment, a propositionwhich further assumes the moral
and legal legitimacy of the state. To raise these issues is not to resolve
them, but it would seem that the burden of proof is on those seeking to
justify the use of force against the individual. Suffice it to say that I am
11. Ibid., pp. 59-63.

12. For a concise summary, see Oppenheimer, p. 31.
13. Del Vecchio, p. 198.
14. See, e.g., Walter Kaufmann, WithoutGuilt andJustice (New York: Peter H. Wyden, Inc.,
1973), esp. chap. 2.
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skepticalof finding any theorywhich justifies the deliberate,forceful imposition of punishment within or without a system of criminal justice.
The final considerationin dealing with punishment as an end in itself
is the possibility that the currentcrisis in the criminal justice system is in
fact a crisis of the paradigmof punishment. While this, if true, does not
resolve the philosophical issues, it does cast doubt on the punishment
paradigm'svitality as the motive force behind a system of criminal justice.
Many advocates of punishment argue that its apparent practical failings
exist becausewe are not punishing enough. All that is needed, they say, is
a crackdownon criminalsand those victims and witnesses who shun participation in the criminal justice system; the only problem with the paradigm
of punishment is that we are not following it." This response fails to
considerwhy the system doggedly refuses to punish to the degree required
to yield beneficial results and instead punishes in such a way as to yield
harmful results.The answer may be that the paradigmof punishment is in
eclipse, that the public lacks the requisite will to apply it in anything but
the prevailing way.
Punishment, particularlystate punishment is the descendant of the
traditionwhich imparts religious and moral authorityto the sovereign and,
through him, the community. Such an authorityis increasinglyless credible
in a secularworld such as ours. Today there is an increasingdesire to allow
each individual to govern his own life as he sees fit provided he does not
violate the rights of others. This desire is exemplified by currentattitudes
toward drug use, abortion, and pornography.Few argue that these things
are good. It is only said that where there is no victim the state or community has no business meddling in the peaceful behavior of its citizens,
however morally suspect it may be.'6
Furthermore,if the paradigmof punishment is in a "crisisperiod"it is
as much because of its practicaldrawbacksas the uncertaintyof its moral
status. The infliction of suffering on a criminal tends to cause a general
feeling of sympathy for him. There is no rational connection between a
term of imprisonment and the harm caused the victim. Since the prison
term is supposedto be unpleasant,at least a part of the public comes to see
the criminalas a victim, and the lack of rationalityalso causes the offender
to feel victimized. This reactionis magnified by the knowledge that most
crimes go unpunished and that even if the offender is caught the judicial
processis long, arduous,and far removed from the criminalact. While this
is obvious to most, it is perhapsless obvious that the punishment paradigm
is largely at fault. The slow, ponderous nature of our system of justice is
largely due to a fear of an unjust infliction of punishment on the innocent
(or even the guilty). The more awful the sanction, the more elaborateneed
15. See, e.g., "Crime: A Case for More Punishment," BusinessWeek(September 15, 1975), pp.
92-97.
16. This problem is examined, though not ultimately resolved, by Edwin M. Schur in his book
Crimeswithout Victims-Deviant Behaviorand Public Policy,Abortion,Homosexuality,and Drug Addiction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).
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be the safeguards.The more the system is perceivedas arbitraryand unfair,
the more incentive there is for defendants and their counsel to thwart the
truth-findingprocess. Acquittal becomes desirableat all costs. As the punitive aspect of a sanction is diminished, so too would be the perceivedneed
for proceduralprotections.
A system of punishment, furthermore, offers no incentive for the
victim to involve himself in the criminal justice process other than to
satisfy his feelings of duty or revenge. The victim stands to gain little if at
all by the conviction and punishment of the person who caused his loss.
This is true even of those systems discussed below which despense state
compensationbased on the victim's need. The system of justice itself imposes uncompensatedcosts by requiringa further loss of time and money
by the victim and witnesses'and by increasingthe perceivedrisk of retaliation.

Finally, punishment which seeks to change an offender's moral outlook, or at least to scare him, can do nothing to provide him with the skills
needed to survive in the outside world. In prison, he learns the advanced
state of the criminal arts and vows not to repeat the mistake that led to his
capture.The convict emerges better trainedand highly motivated to continue a criminal career.
The crisis of the paradigmof punishment has at its roots the collapse
of its twin pillars of support: its moral legitimacy and its practicalefficacy.
As Kaufmann concludes, "the faith in retributivejustice is all but dead."'7
ATTEMPTS TO SALVAGE THE PARADIGM OF PUNISHMENT

"All crises begin with the blurring of a paradigmand the consequent
loosening of the rules for normalresearch."'8And yet until a new paradigm
is presented,authoritieswill cling to the old one, either ignoring the problem or salvaging the paradigm with ad hoc explanations and solutions.
Why are-paradigmsnever rejectedoutright? Why must there always be a
new paradigmbefore the old one is abandoned?Kuhn does not explicitly
discuss this, but R. A. Childs hypothesizes "that, as such, paradigmsmay
serve the function of increasingman's sense of control over some aspect of
reality, or some aspect of his own life. If this is so, then we would expect
that a straightforwardabandonmentof a paradigm would threaten that
sense of control."'9
This psychological need for an explanation may in turn explain the
many efforts to shore up the paradigmof punishment. The three attempts
to be examined next have at their roots a perception of its fundamental
errors,and at the same time they highlight three goals of any new paradigm
of criminal justice.

1. Proportionatepunishment. The king abandoned the composition
17. Kaufmann, p. 46.
18. Kuhn, p. 82.
19. R. A. Childs, "Liberty and the Paradigm of Statism," in The LibertarianAlternative,ed.
Tibor Machan (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Co., 1974), p. 505.
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system20for the system of punishment becausepunishment struck terrorin
the heartsof the people, and this servedto inspire awe for the power of the
king and state. But there was no rational connection between the seriousness of the crime and the gravityof the punishment and, therefore,no limit
to the severityof punishment. Hideous torturescame to be employed: "But
some of the men of the Enlightenment sought to counter the inhumanity
of their Christianpredecessorswith appeals to reason. They thought that
retributive justice had a mathematicalquality and that murder called for
capital punishment in much the same way in which two plus two equals
four."21

The appealto proportionalitywas one of the early attempts to come to
grips with deficiencies in the paradigmof punishment. It was doomed to
failure, for there is no objective standardby which punishments can be
proportionedto fit the crime. Punishment is incommensuratewith crime.
This solution is purely ad hoc and intuitive. We shall, however, find the
goal of proportionatesentencinguseful in the formation of a new paradigm.
2. Rehabilitation.It was noted earlierthat the infliction of punishment
tends to focus attention on the plight of the criminal. Possibly for this
reason,the next humanitariantrend was to explore the proper treatmentof
criminals.Punishment failed to reform the criminal,and this led observers
to inquire how the situation might be improved.Some felt that the sole end
of the penal system was rehabilitation,so attention was turned to modifying the criminal'sbehavior (an obviously manipulativeend). Emphasiswas
placed on education,job training, and discipline.
Unfortunately, the paradigmof punishment and the political realities
of penal administrationhave all but won out. There is simply no incentive
for prison authoritiesto educateand train. Their job is essentially political.
They are judgedby their ability to keep the prisonerswithin the walls and
to keep incidents of violence within the prison to a minimum; as a result,
discipline is the main concern.Furthermore,since he is sentencedto a fixed
number of years (less time off for good behavior-so-called good time),
there is no institutional incentive for the prisoner to improve himself apart
from sheer boredom. Productive labor in prison is virtually nonexistent,
with only obsolete equipment, if any, available.Except perhaps for license
plates and other state needs, the prisoners produce nothing of value; the
prisons make no profit and the workersare paid, if at all, far below market
wages. They are unable to support themselves or their families. The state,
meaning the innocent taxpayer,supports the prisoner, and frequently the
families as well via welfare.

20. Composition was the medieval version of a restitutionarysystem. For a fascinating outline
of how such a system operated and how it came to be supplanted by state-authoredpunishment, see
and Restitutionto Victims of Crime, 2d ed., enl. (Montclair, NJ.:
Stephen Schafer, Compensation
Patterson Smith Publishing Corp., 1970); Richard E. Laster, "Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its
Past History and an Analysis of Its Present Usefulness," Universityof RichmondLaw Review5 (1970):
71-80; L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution(London: Chapman & Hall, 1951).
21. Kaufmann, p. 45.
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Rehabilitationhas been a long-time goal of the penal system, but the
political natureof government-runprisons and the dominance of the paradigm of punishment has inevitably prevented its achievement. Prisons remain detention centers, all too temporarilypreventing crime by physically
confining the criminals.
3. Victim compensation.It is naturalthat the brutalitiesresulting from
the paradigmof punishment would get first attention from humanitarians
and that the persons subjected to those practices would be next. Until
recently, the victim of crime was the forgotten party. Within the last few
years a whole new field has opened up called victimology.22With it has
come a variety of proposals, justifications,and statutes.23
Certainfeatures are common to virtually every compensationproposal:
(a) Compensation for crimes would be dispensed by the state from tax
revenue. (b) Compensationis "a matterof grace"ratherthan an assumption
by the state of legal responsibility for the criminal loss suffered by the
victim. (c) Most proposals allow for aid only on a "need" or "hardship"
basis. (d) Most are limited to some sort of crime of violence or the threat
of force or violence. (e) None questions the paradigmof punishment.
The goal of these proposalsand statutes is laudable.The victim is the
forgotten man of crime. But the means proposedis the same tired formula:
welfare to those in "need." In short, the innocent taxpayer repays the
innocent victim (if the victim can prove he "needs"help) while the guilty
offender is subjected to the sanction of punishment with all its failings.
Like proportionatepunishment and rehabilitation,the goal of victim compensation is a recognition of very real problems in our criminal justice
system, and at the same time it ignores the source of these problems: our
conceptionof crime as an offense against the state whose proper sanctionis
punishment.Until a viable, new paradigmis presented,ad hoc solutions like
the ones discussedhere are all that can be hoped for. And it is a vain hope
indeed, for they attack the symptoms while neglecting the causes of the
problem. What is needed is a new paradigm.
OUTLINE OF A NEW PARADIGM

The idea of restitution is actually quite simple. It views crime as an
offense by one individual against the rights of another. The victim has
suffered a loss. Justice consists of the culpable offender making good the
loss he has caused.It calls for a complete refocusing of our image of crime.
Kuhn would call it a "shift of world-view."Where we once saw an offense
against society, we now see an offense against an individual victim. In a
22. For a brief definition of victimologyy," see Emilo C. Viano, "Victimology: The Study of
the Victim," Victimology1 (1976): 1-7. For an extensive collection of papers on various aspects of
victimology, see Emilo C. Viano, ed., Victimsand Society(Washington, D.C.: Visage Press, 1976).
23. For a discussion and list of symposiums, journal articles, and statutes concerning victim
compensation, see Steven Schafer, pp. 139-57, and appendix; see also Joe Hudson and Burt Galaway,
eds., Consideringthe Victim: Readingsin Restitutionand Victim Compensation
(Springfield, Ill.: Charles
C. Thomas, 1975), esp. pp. 361-436.
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way, it is a common sense view of crime. Thearmedrobberdid not robsociety;
he robbedthe victim.His debt, therefore,is not to society; it is to the victim.
There are really two types of restitution proposals: a system of "punitive"
restitution and a "pure"restitutionalsystem.
1. Punitive restitution. "Since rehabilitationwas admitted to the aims
of penal law two centuries ago, the number of penological aims has remained virtually constant. Restitution is waiting to come in."24Given this
view, restitution should merely be added to the paradigmof punishment.
Stephen Schaferoutlines the proposal: "[Punitive] restitution, like punishment, must always be the subjectof judicial consideration.Without exception it must be carriedout by personalperformanceby the wrong-doer,and
should even then be equally burdensomeand just for all criminals,irrespective of their means, whether they be millionaires or labourers."25
There are many ways by which such a goal might be reached. The
offender might be forced to compensatethe victim by his own work, either
in prison or out. If it came out of his pocket or from the sale of his
propertythis would compensatethe victim, but it would not be sufficiently
unpleasantfor the offender. Another proposal would be that the fines be
proportionateto the earning power of the criminal. Thus, "A poor man
would pay in days of work, a rich man by an equal numberof days' income
or salary."26Herbert Spencer made a proposal along similar lines in his
excellent "Prison-Ethics,"which is well worth examining.27 Murray N.
Rothbardand others have proposeda system of "doublepayments"in cases
of criminal behavior.28While closer to pure restitution than other proposals, the "double damages"concept preservesa punitive aspect.
Punitive restitution is an attempt to gain the benefits of pure restitution, which will be consideredshortly, while retaining the perceivedadvantages of the paradigm of punishment. Thus, the prisoner is still "sentenced"to some unpleasantness-prison labor or loss of X number of days'
income. That the intention is to preserve the "hurt" is indicated by the
hesitation to accept an out-of-pocket payment or sale of assets. This is
considered too "easy" for the criminal and takes none of his time. The
amount of payment is determinednot by the actualharmbut by the ability
of the offenderto pay. Of course, by retaining the paradigmof punishment
this proposalinvolves many of the problems we raisedearlier.In this sense
it can be consideredanother attempt to salvage the old paradigm.
2. Purerestitution."Recompenseor restitutionis scarcelya punishment
as long as it is merely a matter of returning stolen goods or money. ...
24. Gerhard0. W. Mueller, "Compensation for Victims of Crime: Thought before Action,"
MinnesotaLaw Review50 (1965): 221.
25. Schafer, p. 127.
26. Ibid.
27. Herbert Spencer, "Prison-Ethics,"in Essays.Scientific,Politicaland Speculative(New York:
D. Appleton & Co., 1907), 3:152-91.

28. MurrayN. Rothbard, LibertarianForum 14, no. 1 (January 1972): 7-8.
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The point is not that the offender deserves to suffer; it is rather that the
This representsthe complete overoffended partydesires compensation."29
throw of the paradigm of punishment. No longer would the deterrence,
reformation,disablement, or rehabilitationof the criminal be the guiding
principle of the judicial system. The attainment of these goals would be
incidental to, and as a result of, reparationspaid to the victim. No longer
would the criminal deliberatelybe made to suffer for his mistake. Making
good that mistake is all that would be required.What follows is a possible
scenarioof such a system.
When a crime occurredand a suspect was apprehended,a trial court
would attempt to determine his guilt or innocence. If found guilty, the
criminalwould be sentenced to make restitution to the victim.30If a criminal is able to make restitution immediately, he may do so. This would
discharge his liability. If he were unable to make restitution, but were
found by the court to be trustworthy,he would be permitted to remain at
his job (or find a new one) while paying restitution out of his future
wages. This would entail a legal claim against future wages. Failureto pay
could result in garnishment or a new type of confinement.
If it is found that the criminalis not trustworthy,or that he is unable
to gain employment, he would be confined to an employment project.31
This would be an industrialenterprise,preferablyrun by a private concern,
which would produce actualgoods or services.The level of securityat each
employmentprojectwould vary accordingto the behaviorof the offenders.
Since the costs would be lower, inmates at a lower-securityproject would
receive higher wages. There is no reason why many workers could not be
permitted to live with their families inside or outside the facility, depending, again, on the trustworthinessof the offender. Room and board would
be deducted from the wages first, then a certain amount for restitution.
Anything over that amount the worker could keep or apply toward further
restitution, thus hastening his release. If a worker refused to work, he
would be unable to pay for his maintenance,and therefore would not in
principle be entitled to it. If he did not make restitution he could not be
released.The exact arrangementwhich would best provide for high productivity, minimal security, and maximum incentive to work and repay the
victim cannot be determinedin advance.Experienceis bound to yield some
29. Kaufmann, p. 55.
30. The nature of judicial procedurebest designed to carry out this task must be determined.
For a brief discussion of some relevant considerations, see Laster, pp. 80-98; Burt Galaway and Joe
Hudson, "Issues in the Correctional Implementation of Restitution to Victims of Crime," in Considering the Victim,pp. 351-60. Also to be dealt with is the proper standardof compensation. At least
initially, the problem of how much payment constitutes restitution would be no different than
similar considerationsin tort law. This will be considered at greater length below.
31. Such a plan (with some significant differences) has been suggested by Kathleen J. Smith
Prison Sentence(London: Gerald, Duckworth &
in A Curefor Crime.The Casefor the Self-determinate
Co., 1965), pp. 13-29; see also Morris and Linda Tannehill, The Marketfor Liberty(Lansing, Mich.:
Privately printed, 1970), pp. 44-108.
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plans superiorto others. In fact, the experimentationhas alreadybegun.32
While this might be the basic system, all sorts of refinements are
conceivable,and certainlymany more will be invented as needs arise.A few
examples might be illuminating. With such a system of repayment,victim
crimeinsurancewould be more economically feasible than at present and
highly desirable. The cost of awards would be offset by the insurance
company'sright to restitution in place of the victim (right of subrogation).
The insurancecompany would be better suited to supervise the offender
and mark his progress than would the victim. To obtain an earlierrecovery,
it could be expected to innovate so as to enable the worker to repay more
quickly (and, as a result, be released that much sooner). The insurance
companies might even underwritethe employment projects themselves as
well as relatedindustries which would employ the skilled worker after his
release. Any successful effort on their part to reduce crime and recidivism
would result in fewer claims and lower premiums. The benefit of this
insurancescheme for the victim is immediate compensation,conditionalon
the victim's continued cooperationwith the authorities for the arrestand
conviction of the suspect. In addition, the centralizationof victim claims
would, arguably,lead to efficiencies which would permit the pooling of
small claims against a common offender.
Another highly useful refinement would be directarbitrationbetween
victim and criminal. This would serve as a sort of healthy substitute for
plea bargaining. By allowing the guilty criminal to negotiate a reduced
payment in return for a guily plea, the victim (or his insurancecompany)
would be saved the risk of an adverse finding at trial and any possible
additional expense that might result. This would also allow an indigent
criminalto substitutepersonal servicesfor monetarypaymentsif all parties
agreed.
Arbitrationis argued for by John M. Greacen, deputy director of the
National Institute for Law Enforcementand CriminalJustice. He sees the
possible advantages of such reform as the

".

.

development of more

creative dispositions for most criminal cases; for criminal victims the increaseduse of restitution, the knowledge that their interests were considered in the criminalprocess;and an increasedsatisfactionwith the outcome;
increasedawarenessin the part of the offender that his crime was committed against another human being, and not against society in general; increased possibility that the criminal process will cause the offender to
acknowledge responsibility for his acts."" Greacen notes several places

32. For a recent summary report, see Burt Galaway, "Restitution as an Integrative Punishment" (paper preparedfor the Symposium on Crime and Punishment: Restitution, Retribution, and
Law, Harvard Law School, March 1977).
33. John M. Greacen, "Arbitration:A Tool for Criminal Cases?"Barrister(Winter 1975), p.
53; see also Galaway and Hudson, pp. 352-55; "Conclusions and Recommendations, International
Study Institute on Victimology, Bellagio, Italy, July 1-12, 1975," Victimology1 (1976): 150-51;
Ronald Goldfarb,Jails: The UltimateGhetto(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976), p.
480.
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where such a system has been tried with great success, most notably Tucson, Arizona, and Columbus, Ohio.34
Something analogous to the medieval Irish system of suretiesmight be
employed as well." Such a system would allow a concernedperson, group,
or companyto make restitution (providedthe offender agrees to this). The
worker might then be releasedin the custody of the surety. If the surety
had made restitution,the offender would owe restitutionto the suretywho
might enforce the whole claim or show mercy. Of course, the more violent
and unreliable the offender, the more serious and costly the offense, the
less likely it would be that anyone would take the risk. But for first
offenders, good workers, or others that charitableinterests found deserving
(or perhapsunjustly convicted) this would provide an avenue of respite.
RESTITUTIONAND RIGHTS

These three possible refinements clearly illustrate the flexibility of a
restitutionalsystem. It may be less apparentthat this flexibility is inherent
to the restitutionalparadigm. Restitution recognizes rights in the victim,
and this is a principal source of its strength. The nature and limit of the
victim's right to restitution at the same time defines the natureand limit of
the criminal liability. In this way, the aggressive action of the criminal
createsa debtto the victim. The recognition of rights and obligations make
possible many innovative arrangements.Subrogation,arbitration,and suretyship are three examples mentioned above. They are possible because this
right to compensation" is consideredthe property of the victim and can
therefore be delegated, assigned, inherited, or bestowed. One could determinein advancewho would acquirethe right to any restitutionwhich he
himself might be unable to collect.
The naturalowner of an unenforceddeath claim would be an insurance
companythat had insured the deceased.The suggestion has been made that
a person might thus increasehis personal safety by insuring with a company well known for tracking down those who injure its policy holders. In
fact, the partialpurpose of some insuranceschemes might be to provide the
funds with which to track down the malefactor. The insurancecompany,
having paid the beneficiarieswould "standin their shoes." It would remain
possible, of course, to simply assign or devise the right directly to the
beneficiaries,but this would put the burden of enforcement on persons
likely to be unsuited to the task.
If one acceptsthe Lockeantrichotomyof propertyownership,37that is,
acquiringpropertyvia exchange,gifts, and homesteading
(mixing one's labor
34. Greacen, p. 53.
35. For a description of the Irish system, see Joseph R. Peden, "PropertyRights in Medieval
Ireland:Celtic Law versus Church and State" (paper presented at the Symposium on the Origins and
Development of Property Rights, University of San Francisco, January 1973); for a theoretical
discussion of a similar proposal, see Spencer, pp. 182-86.
36. Or, perhaps more accurately,the compensation itself.
37. For a brief explanation of this concept and several of its possible applications, see Murray
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with previouslyunowned land or objects), the possibility arises that upon a
person's wrongful death, in the absenceof any heirs or assignees, his right
to compensation becomes unowned property. The right could then be
claimed (homesteaded) by anyone willing to go to the trouble of catching
and prosecutingthe criminal.Firmsmight specializein this sort of activity,
or large insurance companies might make the effort as a kind of "loss
leader"for public relations purposes.
This does, however, lead to a potentially serious problem with the
restitutionalparadigm:what exactly constitutes "restitution"?What is the
standardby which compensationis to be made?Earlierwe assertedthat any
such problem facing the restitutionalparadigmfaces civil damage suits as
well. The method by which this problem is dealt with in civil cases could
be applied to restitution cases. But while this is certainly true, it may be
that this problem has not been adequatelyhandled in civil damage suits
either.
Restitution in cases of crimes against property is a manageableproblem. Modern contract and tort doctrines of restitution are adequate.The
difficulty lies in cases of personalinjury or death. How can you put a price
on life or limb, pain or suffering? Is not any attempt to do so of necessity
arbitrary?It must be admitted that a fully satisfactory solution to this
problem is lacking, but it should also be stressedthat this dilemna, though
serious, has little impact on the bulk of our case in favor of a restitutional
paradigm.It is possible that no paradigmof criminaljustice can solve every
problem, yet the restitutional approach remains far superior to the paradigm of punishment or any other conceivable rival.
This difficulty arises becausecertainpropertyis unique and irreplaceable. As a result, it is impossible to approximatea "market"or "exchange"
value expressedin monetary terms.Just as there is no rational relationship
between a wrongfully taken life and ten years in prison, there is little
relationship between that same life and $20,000. Still, the nature of this
possibly insoluble puzzle revealsa restitutionalapproachtheoreticallysuperior to punishment. For it must be acknowledgedthat a real, tangible loss
has occurred.The problem is only one of incommensurability.Restitution
providessometangible, albeit inadequate,compensationfor personal injury.
Punishment provides none at all.38
It might be objected that to establish some "pay scale" for personal
injuryis not only somewhat arbitrarybut also a disguised reimplementation
of punishment. Unable to acceptthe inevitable consequencesof restitutional punishment, the argumentcontinues, I have retreatedto a pseudorestitutional award.Such a criticism is unfair. The true test in this instance is one
of primacyof intentions. Is the purpose of a system to compensatevictims
N. Rothbard, "Justiceand Property Rights," in Propertyin a HumaneEconomy,ed. Samuel L. Blumenfeld (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 101-22.
38. That the "spiritual" satisfaction which punishment may or may not provide is to be
recognized as a legitimate form of "compensation" is a claim retributionists must defend.
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for their losses (and perhaps,as a consequence,punish the criminals), or is
its purposeto punish the criminals(and perhaps,as a consequence,compensate the victims for their losses)? The true ends of a criminaljustice system
will determine its nature. In short, arbitrarinessalone does not imply a
retributivemotive. And while arbitrarinessremains to some extent a problem for the restitutional paradigm,it is less of a problem for restitution
than for punishment, since compensationhas some rational relationship to
damages and costs.
ADVANTAGESOF A RESTITUTIONALSYSTEM

1. The first and most obvious advantageis the assistanceprovided to
victims of crime. They may have suffered an emotional, physical, or financial loss. Restitution would not change the fact that a possibly traumatic
crime has occurred (just as the award of damages does not undo tortious
conduct). Restitution, however, would make the resulting loss easierto bear
for both victims and their families. At the same time, restitution would
avoid a majorpitfall of victim compensation/welfare plans: Since it is the
criminal who must pay, the possibility of collusion between victim and
criminal to collect "damages"from the state would be all but eliminated.
2. The possibility of receiving compensationwould encouragevictims
to reportcrimesand to appearat trial. This is particularlytrue if there were
a crime insurancescheme which contractuallycommitted the policyholder
to testify as a condition for payment,thus renderingunnecessaryoppressive
and potentially tyrannicalsubpoenasand contempt citations. Even the actual reportingof the crime to police is likely to be a prerequisitefor compensation. Such a requirement in auto theft insurance policies has made car
thefts the most fully reported crime in the Unites States. Furthermore,
insurancecompanieswhich paid the claim would have a strong incentive to
see that the criminal was apprehendedand convicted. Their pressure and
assistancewould make the proper functioning of law enforcement officials
all the more likely.
3. Psychologist Albert Eglash has long argued that restitution would
aid in the rehabilitationof criminals."Restitution is something an inmate
does, not something done for or to him.

.

.

. Being reparative, restitution

can alleviate guilt and anxiety, which can otherwise precipitate further
of fenses."39Restitution, says Eglash, is an active effortful role on the part
of the offender. It is socially constructive, thereby contributing to the
offender's self-esteem. It is relatedto the offense and may thereby redirect
the thoughts which motivated the offense. It is reparative,restorative,and
may actuallyleave the situationbetter than it was before the crime, both for
the criminal and victim.40
39. Albert Eglash, "Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Prison Rehabilitation Programs," AmericanJournal of Correction40 (November-December 1958): 20.
40. Ibid.; see also Eglash's "Creative Restitution: A Broader Meaning for an Old Term,"
Journal of CriminalLaw and Criminology48 (1958): 619-22; Burt Galaway andJoe Hudson, "Restitu-
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4. This is a genuinely "self-determinative"sentence.4"The worker
would know that the length of his confinement was in his own hands. The
harderhe worked, the faster he would make restitution. He would be the
master of his fate and would have to face that responsibility.This would
encourageuseful, productive activity and instill a conception of rewardfor
good behaviorand hard work. Comparethis with the currentprobationary
system and "indeterminatesentencing" where the decision for release is
made by the prison bureaucracy,based only (if fairly administered) on
"good behavior";that is, passive acquiescenceto prison discipline. Also, the
fact that the worker would be acquiringmarketableskills rather than more
skillful methods of crime should help to reduce the shocking rate of recidivism.
5. The savings to taxpayerswould be enormous. No longer would the
innocent taxpayerpay for the apprehensionand internment of the guilty.
The cost of arrest, trial, and internment would be borne by the criminal
himself. In addition, since now-idle inmates would become productive
workers (able, perhaps, to support their families), the entire economy
would benefit from the increasein overall production.42
6. Crime would no longer pay. Criminals, particularlyshrewd whitecollar criminals,would know that they could not dispose of the proceedsof
their crime and, if caught, simply serve time. They would have to make full
restitution plus enforcement and legal costs, thereby greatly increasingthe
incentive to prosecute.While this would not eliminate such crime it would
make it rougher on certain types of criminals, like bank and corporation
officials, who harm many by their acts with a virtual assuranceof lenient
legal sanctions.43It might also encouragesuch criminalsto keep the money
around for a while so that, if caught, they could repay more easily. This
would make a full recoverymore likely.
A restitutionalsystem of justicewould benefit the victim, the criminal,
and the taxpayer.The humanitariangoals of proportionatepunishment,
rehabilitation,and victim compensation are dealt with on a fundamental
level making their achievement more likely. In short, the paradigm of
restitution would benefit all but the entrenched penal bureaucracyand
enhance justice at the same time. What then is there to stop us from
overthrowingthe paradigmof punishment and its penal system and putting
in its place this more efficient, more humane, and more just system? The
proponents of punishment and others have a few powerful counterarguments. It is to these we now turn.
tion and Rehabilitation-Some Central Issues," Crimeand Delinquency18 (1972): 403-10.
41. Smith, pp. 13-29.
42. An economist who favors restitution on efficiency grounds is Gary S. Becker, although he
does not break with the paradigm of punishment. Those interested in a mathematical "cost-benefit"
analysis should see his "Crime and Punishment,"Journal of Political Economy76 (1968): 169-217.
43. This point is also made by Minocher Jehangirji Sethna in his paper, "Treatment and
Atonement for Crime," in Victimsand Society,p. 538.
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OBJECTIONS TO RESTITUTION

1. Practicalcriticisms of restitution. It might be objected that "crimes
disturband offend not only those who are directly their victim, but also the
whole social order."' Becauseof this, society, that is, individualsother than
the victim, deserves some satisfaction from the offender. Restitution, it is
argued, will not satisfy the lust for revenge felt by the victim or the
"community's sense of justice." This criticism appears to be overdrawn.
Today most membersof the communityare mere spectatorsof the criminal
justice system, and this is largely true even of the victim.45 One major
reform being urged presently is more victim involvement in the criminal
justice process.' The restitution proposal would necessitate this involvement. And while the public generallytakes the view that officials should be
tougher on criminals, with "tougher" taken by nearly everyone to mean
more severe in punishing, one must view this "social fact" in light of the
lack of a known alternative.The real test of public sympathieswould be to
see which sanctionpeople would choose: incarcerationof the criminalfor a
given numberof yearsor the criminal'sbeing compelled to make restitution
to the victim: While the public's choice is not clearly predictable,neither
can it be assumedthat it would rejectrestitution.There is some evidence to
the contrary.47
44. Del Vecchio, p. 198.
45. William F. McDonald, "Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The
Return of the Victim," AmericanCriminalLaw Review13 (1976): 659; see also his paper "Notes on
the Victim's Role in the Prosecutional and Dispositional Stages of the Criminal Justice Process"
(paper presented at the Second InternationalSymposium on Victimology, Boston, September 1976);
Jack M. Kress, "The Role of the Victim at Sentencing" (paper presented at the Second International
Symposium on Victimology, Boston, September 1976).
46. McDonald, pp. 669-73; Kress, pp. 11-15. Kress specifically analyzes restitution as a means
for achieving victim involvement.
47. In two types of studies conducted for the Ventura County Board of Supervisors,Ventura,
California, support for a restitutional program was indicated: "Both the citizen attitude survey and
the Delphi goal-setting exercise revealed a strong concern for the victim as the 'forgotten man' of
criminal justice. The Delphi panelists, in particular,emphasized the need for new kinds of criminal
penalties in which the offender would be requiredto make restitution to his victim(s)" (Development
of a Model CriminalJustice System[Santa Barbara,Calif.: Public Safety Systems, 1973], p. 85). The
report recommends the implementing of a system of restitution. In the two cities mentioned earlier
(Columbus and Tucson), support, at least by the parties involved, appearedstrong. In the thousands
of cases arbitratedby trained law students in Columbus, only 4 percent proceeded further up in the
criminal system. In Tucson after one year the program has been successful in all but nine of 204
cases (with the cost of handling each case at $304 compared with $1,566 required to process the
average felony case). General approval of restitution in lieu of punishment was indirectly referredto
in the ColumbiaLaw Review'soft-cited study, "Restitution and the Criminal Law":"[E]ven where the
complainant can be persuadedto continue the criminal case, after having received private satisfaction,
his apathy is often so pronounced and his demeanor so listless that he becomes an extremely weak
witness. . . . Also the knowledge of actual restitution seems to greatly assuage the jury. Even the
knowledge of the existence of a civil suit can lead the jury to recommend leniency or acquittal" (39
[1939]: 1189; see also n. 31). Restitution, it seems, is accepted and preferred by the average person.
Early studies indicate that, when properly administered, even offenders perceive a restitutionary
sanction as fair (William Marsella and Burt Galaway, "Study of the Perceived Fairnessof Restitution
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This brings us to a second practicalobjection: that monetarysanctions
are insufficient deterrentsto crime. Again, this is something to be discovered, not something to be assumed. There are a number of reasons to
believe that our currentsystem of punishment does not adequatelydeter,
and for the reasonsdiscussedearlieran increasein the level of punishment
is unlikely. In fact, many have argued that the deterrentvalue of sanctions
has less to do with severitythan with certainty,48and the precedingconsiderations indicatethat law enforcementwould be more certainunder a restitutional system. In the final analysis, however, it is irrelevantto argue that
more crimes may be committed if our proposal leaves the victim better off.
It must be remembered:Ourgoal is not the suppression
of crime;it is doing
justiceto victims.
A practicalconsiderationwhich merits considerablefuture attention is
the feasibility of the employment project proposal. A number of questions
can be raised. At first blush, it seems naively optimistic to suppose that
offenders will be able or willing to work at all, much less earn their keep
and pay reparationsas well. On the contrary, this argument continues,
individuals turn to crime precisely because they lack the skills which the
restitutionalplan assumes they have. Even if these workershave the skills,
but refuse to work, what could be done? Would not the use of force to
compel compliancebe tantamountto slavery?This criticism results in part
from my attempt to sketch an "ideal" restitution system; that is, I have
attempted to outline the type toward which every criminal justice system
governed by the restitution paradigmshould strive. This is not to say that
every aspect of the hypothetical system would, upon implementation,function smoothly. Rather, such a system could only operate ideally once the
paradigmhad been fully acceptedand substantiallyarticulated.
With this in mind, one can advanceseveral responses.First, the problem as usually posed assumes the offender to be highly irrational and
possibly mentally unbalanced.There is no denying that some segment of
the criminal population fits the former description.49What this approach
neglects, however, is the possibility that many criminalsare making rational
choices within an irrationaland unjust political system. SpecificallyI refer
to the myriadlaws and regulationswhich make it difficult for the unskilled
or persons of transitoryoutlook" to find legal employment."1I refer also to
as a Sanction for Juvenile Offenders" [paper presented to the Second International Symposium on
Victimology, Boston, September 1976]).
48. Yochelson and Samenow, pp. 453-57.
49. For a discussion rejecting the usefulness of the latter description, see Szasz, pp. 91-146; for
a recent study verifying Szasz's thesis, see Yochelson and Samenow, esp. pp. 227-35.
50. Edward C. Banfield put forth his controversial theory of time horizon in his book The
UnheavenlyCity (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970) and amplified it in The UnheavenlyCity Revisited
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), and most recently, "Present-orientednessand Crime" (paper
preparedfor the Symposium on Crime and Punishment: Restitution, Retribution, and Law, Harvard
Law School, March 1977). For a critical, but favorable analysis of this approach, see Gerald P.
O'Driscoll, Jr., "Professor Banfield on Time Horizon: What Has He Taught Us about Crime?"
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the laws which deny legality to the types of serviceswhich are in particular
demand in economically impoverished communities.52Is it "irrational"to
choose to steal or rob when one is virtually foreclosed from the legal
opportunityto do otherwise?Another possibility is that the criminalchooses crime not because of foreclosure, but because he enjoys and obtains
satisfaction from a criminal way of life.53Though morally repugnant,this
is hardly irrational.
Furthermore,it no longer can be denied that contact with the current
criminaljustice system is itself especially damaging among juveniles."4The
offenders who are hopelessly committed to criminalbehaviorare not usually the newcomersto crime but those who have had repeatedexposure to the
penal system. In Kuhn's words, "Existing institutions have ceased to meet
the problems posed by an environmenttheyhavein part created."'"
While a
restitutionarysystem might not change these hard-coreoffenders, it could,
by the early implementation of sanctions perceived by the criminal to be
just, breakthe vicious circle which in large part accountsfor their existence.
Finally, if offenders could not or would not make restitution, then the
logical and just result of their refusal would be confinement until they
could or would. Such an outcome would be entirely in their hands. While
this "solution" does not suggest who should justly pay for this confinement, the problem is not unique to a restitutionarysystem. In this and
other areasof possible difficulty we must seek guidance from existing pilot
programs as well as from the burgeoning research in this area and in
victimology in general.
2. Distributionarycriticismsof restitution.There remainsone criticism
of restitutionwhich is the most obvious and the most difficult with which
to deal. Simply stated, it takes the following form: "Doesn't this mean that
rich people will be able to commit crimes with impunity if they can afford
it? Isn't this unfair?"The practicalaspect of this objection is that whatever
deterrenteffect restitution payments may have, they will be less for those
most able to pay. The moral aspect is that whatever retributive or penal
(paper preparedfor the same symposium). A contrary, but ultimately compatible view is presented
by Yochelson and Samenow, pp. 369-72.
51. For example, minimum wage laws, and so-called closed-shop union protectionist legislation.
52. For example, laws prohibiting gambling, prostitution, sale of drugs, "jitney" cab services,
etc.
53. "It is not the environment that turns a man into a criminal. Rather it is a series of choices
that he makes at a very early age. . . . [T]he criminal is not a victim of circumstances"(Yochelson
and Samenow, pp. 247, 249). This is in essence the main conclusion of their research. (For a concise
summary of their provocative book, see Joseph Boorkin, "The Criminal Personality," FederalBar
Journal 35 [1976]: 237-41.) In The CriminalPersonality,vol. 2, The Processof Change (New York:
Jason Aronson, Inc., 1977) they relate and examine the methods they have employed to change the
criminal thought pattern. Of course, such an approach can itself be subject to abuse.
54. See, e.g., Edwin M. Schur, RadicalNoninterventionism,
Rethinkingthe DelinquencyProblem
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973).
55. Kuhn,-p. 92 (emphasis added).
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effect restitution payments may have they will be less for those who are
well off. Some concept of equality of justice underlies both considerations.
Critics of restitution fail to realize that the "cost" of crime will be
quite high. In addition to compensationfor pain and suffering, the criminal
must pay for the cost of his apprehension,the cost of the trial, and the
legal expendituresof both sides. This should make even an unscrupulous
wealthy person think twice about committing a crime. The response to this
is that we cannot have it both ways. If the fines would be high enough to
bother the rich, then they would be so high that a project worker would
have no chance of earning that much and would, therefore,have no incentive to work at all. If, on the other hand, you lower the price of crime by
ignoring all its costs, you fail to deter the rich or fully compensate the
victim.
This is where the option of arbitrationand victim crime insurance
becomes of practicalimportance.If the victim is uninsured,he is unlikely
to recover for all costs of a very severe crime from a poor, unskilled
criminal,since even in an employmentproject the criminalmight be unable
to earn enough. If he had no hope of earning his release, he would have
little incentive to work very hard beyond paying for his own maintenance.
The victim would end up with less than if he had "settled"the case for the
lesser amount which a projectworker could reasonablybe expected to earn.
If, however, the victim had full-coverage criminal insurance, he would
recover his damages in full, and the insurancecompany would absorb any
disparity between full compensation and maximal employment project
worker'soutput. This cost would be reflected in premium prices, enabling
the insurancecompany which settled cases at an amount which increased
the recovery from the criminal to offer the lowest rates. Eventually a
"maximum"feasible fine for project workers would be determined based
on these considerations.The "rich," on the other hand, would naturally
have to pay in full. This arrangementwould solve the practicalproblem,
but it should not be thought of as an imperativeof the restitutionalparadigm.
The same procedure of varying the payments according to ability to
pay would answer the moral considerationsas well (that the rich are not
hurt enough) and this is the prime motive behind punitiverestitution proposals. However, we reject the moral considerationoutright. The paradigm
of restitutioncalls not for the (equal) hurting of criminals,but for restitution to victims. Any appeal to "inadequatesuffering" is a reversion to the
paradigm of punishment, and by varying the sanction for crimes of the
same magnitudeaccordingto the economic status of the offender it reveals
its own inequity. Equalityofjusticemeansequaltreatmentof victims.It should
not matter to the victim if his attackerwas rich or poor. His plight is the
same regardless. Any reduction of criminal liability because of reduced
earning power would be for practical,not moral, reasons.
Equalityof justice derives from the fact that the rights of men should
be equally enforced and respected.Restitution recognizesa victim's right to
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compensationfor damages from the party responsible. Equality of justice,
therefore, calls for equal enforcement of each victim's right to restitution.
Evenif necessary
or expedient,any lesseningofpaymentto the victimbecauseof the
qualitiesof the criminalis a violationof that victim'srightsand an inequalityof
justice.Any such expedient settlement is only a recognition that an imperfect world may make possible only imperfect justice. As a practicalmatter,
a restitutional standard gives victims an enormous incentive to pursue
wealthy criminalssince they can afford quick, full compensation.Contrast
this with the present system where the preferencegiven the wealthy is so
prevalent that most victims simply assume that nothing will be done.
The paradigmof restitution,to reiterate,is neither a panaceafor crime
nor a blueprintfor utopia. Panaceasand utopias are not for humankind.We
must live in a less than perfect world with less than perfect people. Restitution opens the possibility of an improved and more just society. The old
paradigmof punishment, even reformed,simply cannot offer this promise.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Space does not permit a full examination of other less fundamental
implications of such a system. I shall briefly consider five.
1. Civil versus criminalliability. If one acceptsa restitutionarystandard
of justice, what sense does it make to distinguish between crime and tort,
since both call for payment of damages?For most purposes I think the
distinction collapses. Richard Epstein, in a series of brilliant articles, has
articulateda theory of strict liability in tort."6His view is that since one
party has caused another some harm and one of the parties must bear the
loss, justice demands that it falls on the party who caused the harm. He
argues that intention is only relevant as a "third-stage"argument; that
notwithstanding some fault on the part of the plaintiff (a second-stage
argument),the defendant intendedthe harm and is thereforeliable.57With
a restitutionalsystem I see no reason why Epstein's theory of tort liability
could not incorporatecriminal liability into a single "system of corrective
justice that looks to the conduct,broadlydefined, of the parties to the case
with a view toward the protection of individual liberty and private property.
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56. Richard A. Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability in Tort," Journal of Legal Studies 2
(1973): 151-204.
57. RichardA. Epstein, "Intentional Harms,"Journal of Legal Studies3 (1975): 402-8; see also
his article "Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability," ibid., 3 (1974): 174-85.
58. Epstein, "Intentional Harms," p. 441. Epstein himself would disagree. In a recent article,
also notable for its well-reasoned rejection of victim compensation/welfare schemes, "Crime and
Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles" (paper prepared for the Symposium on Crime and Punishment:
Restitution, Retribution and Law, HarvardLaw School, March 1977), he draws an emphatic distinction between tort and criminal law. He rests this distinction on two characteristicsof the criminal
law: (a) that its function is to punish (and therefore mens rea is required and more stringent
proceduralsafeguardsare appropriate),and (b) since the defendant is prosecutedby the state, fairness
as between the parties is not relevant. From these assumptions, Epstein reasons quite correctly that
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There would, at least initially, be some differences, however. The calculation of damages under the restitutionaryparadigmwhich includes cost
of apprehension, cost of trial, and legal costs of both parties would be
higher than tort law allows. A further distinction would be the power of
enforcers to confine unreliableoffenders to employment projects.59
2. Criminalresponsibilityand competency. Once a criminal sanction is
based not on the offender's badnessbut on the natureand consequencesof
his acts, Thomas Szasz'sproposalthat the insanity plea be abolished makes
a great deal of sense,' as does his argumentthat "all persons chargedwith
offenses-except those grossly disabled-[are fit to stand trial and] should
be tried.""6On this view, Epstein'sconcept of fairness as betweentheparties
is relevant.A restitution proceedinglike a "lawsuit is always a comparative
affair. The defendant's victory ensures the plaintiff's [or victim's] defeat.
. . . Why should we prefer the injurer to his victim in a case where one
may win and the other lose? . . . As a matter of fairness between the
parties, the defendant should be requiredto treat the harms which he has
inflicted upon another as though they were inflicted upon himself."62
3. Victimless crimes. The effect of restitutionalstandardson the legality of such crimes as prostitution,gambling, high interest loans, pornography, and drug use is intriguing. There has been no violation of individual
rights, and consequently no damages and, therefore, no liability. While
some may see this as a drawback,I believe it is a striking advantageof the
restitutionalstandardof justice. So-calledvictimless crimes would in principle cease to be crimes. As a consequence, criminal elements would be
denied a lucrative monopoly, and the price of these services would be
the two systems are inherently different. It should be obvious that a restitutionaryparadigm undermines both assumptions. Gilbert M. Cantor in his article, "An End to Crime and Punishment"
(Shingle 39 [May 1976]: 99-114), takes precisely this view, arguing that "the time has come to
abolish the game of crime and punishment and to substitute a paradigm of restitution and responsibility. I urge that we assign (reassign, actually) to the civil law our societal response to the acts or
behaviors we now label and treat as criminal. The goal is the civilization of our treatment of
offenders. I use the word, 'civilization' here in its specific meaning: to bring offenders under the
civil, rather than the criminal law; and in its larger meaning: to move in this area of endeavor from
barbarismtoward greater enlightenment and humanity" (p. 107; emphasis in original).
59. It would seem that the only way to account for these differences would be an appeal to the
reaor badness of the criminal as opposed to the unintentional tortfeasor. Yet such an approach,
means
it might be argued, is not available to a restitutionarysystem which considers the moral outlook of
an offender to be irrelevant to the determinationof the proper criminal sanction. A possible response
is that this overstates the restitutionist claim. That a criminal's mental state does not justify punishment does not imply that it is not relevant to any aspect of the criminal justice process. It may well
be that it is relevant to the considerationof methods by which one is justified in extracting what, on
other grounds, is shown to be a proper sanction, that is, restitution.
60. Szasz, pp. 228-30.
61. Ibid., pp. 228-29. "The emphasis here is on gross disability: it should be readily apparent
or easily explicable to a group of lay persons, like a jury" (p. 229). But even the qualification of gross
disablement might be unjustified (see Yochelson and Samenow, pp. 227-35).
62. Epstein, p. 398. In his article "Crimeand Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles," he takes exactly
this approach with the insanity defense in tort law.
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drasticallyreduced.Without this enormous income, organizedcrime would
be far less able to afford the "cost" of its nefarious activities than it is
today.
4. Legal positivism. What is true for victimless crimes is true for the
philosophy of legal positivism. On the positivist view, whatever the state
(following all the correct political procedures) says is law, is law; hence,
whatever the state makes a crime is a crime. A restitutionalstandardwould
hold the state to enforcing individual rights through the recoveryof individual damages.
5. Legal process. Because the sanction for crime would no longer be
punitive, the criminal process could explore less formal procedures for
dispute settlement. Also, the voice of the victim would be added to the
deliberations.One possible reform might be a three-tieredverdict: guilty,
not proven, and not guilty. If found "guilty," the offender would pay all
the costs mentioned above. If the charges are "not proven," then neither
party would pay the other. If found "not guilty," the defendant would be
reimbursedby the enforcement agency for his costs and inconvenience.
This new interpretation of "not guilty" would reward those defendants
who, after putting on a defense, convinced the trier of fact that they were
innocent.

These and many other fascinatingimplications of restitution deserve a
more thorough examination. As any new paradigm becomes accepted, it
experienceswhat Kuhn calls a period of "normalresearch,"a period characterizedby continuousexpansion and perfection of the new paradigmas well
as a testing of its limits. The experimentationwith restitutionaryjustice
will, however,differ from the trialand errorof the recentpast since we will
be guided by the principle that the purpose of our legal system is not to
harm the guilty but to help the innocent-a principle which will above all
restore our belief that our overridingcommitment is to do justice.
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